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IN THE SUPRE~fE COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
EAGLE EQUITY FUND, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
TITLEONE CORPORATION, and Idaho 
corporation; and COREY BARTON HOMES, 
INC., an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY 
(fk:a Land America Transnation, aka 
Transnation Title & Escrow, Inc.), a Delaware 
corporation; CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Nebraska or Florida 
corporation (fka Ticor Title Insurance 
Company, a California corporation); RBC 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE, INC.; 
ALLIANCE TITLE & ESCROW CORP., an 
Idaho Limited Liability Company and JOHN 
DOES III-X, unknown Individuals and/or 
compames, 
Defendants. 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
ln and for the County of Ada 
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The Honorable Jason Scott, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Eagle Equity-Appellant 
Mr. Paul Mangiantini ISB #5883 
Mr. Aaron J. Tribble ISB #8951 
Eagle Law Center, LLC 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive Ste. 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Counsel for Corey Barton-Respondent 
Mr. David Krueck 
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht P.A. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Counsel for TitleOne-Respondent 
Mr. Tom Dvorak ISB #5043 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eagle Equity Fund, LLC ("EEF") through this reply brief \Vill first address the 
s Brief by TitleOne Corporation ("TitleOne") follow with a reply to the 
Respondent's Brief filed by Corey Barton Homes, Inc. ("CBH"). For purposes of this appeal 
going forward, EEF agrees that J.C. §5-218(1) applies to EEF' s LC. §45-1205 claim. EEF further 
agrees that its claim for generai neghgence was waived by EEF at trial. The two remaming 
claims against TitleOne that were dismissed by way of summary judgment, EEF's LC. §45-1205 
claim and EEF's claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, will be 
addressed in this brief. 
II. ARGUMENT - TITLEONE 
A. The District Erred When It Concluded That EEF Failed To Offer Competent 
Evidence Of Damages 
TitleOne accurately states that the determination of the issue of EEF's damages is 
applicable to all of EEF's claims and should be resolved first. TitleOne then argues that "EEF 
cannot prove what could have or would have happened had it participated [in the short sale]. 
Why, for instance, would it have spent more money on property that would not sustain its 
worth?" Respondent's Brief, page 13. TitleOne has posed a question that requires the analysis of 
disputed material facts. That analysis should have been performed by a jury and not by the Court 
on summary judgment. 
The trial court in its Memorandum, Decision and Order dated September 14, 2014 held 
the following: 
It [EEF] offers no evidence that the property's value, as of 
the date of either the apparently improper reconveyance or the 
property's short sale, was sufficient to satisfy RBC' s senior deed of 
trust. Without proof that the property's value, as of at least one 
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of those times, exceeded the amount owing to RBC, there is no 
proof that EEFs deed of trust was worth anything at any material 
time. 
* * * 
Another argument EEF advances is that, had it known about the 
short sale, it might have negotiated to purchase the property itself 
That could have happened in theory, but EEF offers no 
evidence of the price it would have had to pay to buy the property 
(presumably more than DAS paid for it, as a competition between 
DAS and EEF for the property probably would have driven 
up the price), nor does EEF offer evidence that the value of the 
property was higher than the price EEF would have had to pay for 
it EEF does not show damages by simply presuming that, in the 
absence of the apparently wrongful reconveyance, it would have 
bought the property instead of DAS and resold it to Corey Barton 
Homes for a profit, just as DAS did. (R at 003059-003060) 
The trial court was focused entirely upon the value of the RBC first position Deed of Trust 
as the determining factor in its analysis of what damage EEF sustained. What the trial court 
missed is the concept that EEF' s acquisition of RBC' s first position Deed of Trust through the 
short sale would have then placed the EEF Deed of Trust in first position. The valuation analysis 
would then have focused on the amount of the EEF Deed of Trust ($725,500) compared to the 
fair market value of the property. In that situation, EEF would have been fully secured. That is 
why evidence of what EEF would have done in connection with the short sale is relevant yet it 
was disregarded by the Court. 
EEF submitted evidence to the trial court through the deposition testimony and Affidavit 
of Dan Thompson, principal of EEF, that if EEF had received notice of the short sale that EEF 
would have taken action to protect its security interest. Mr. Thompson's affidavit states the 
following: 
10. EQ[EEF] would have been interested in buying out the first 
position at the terms offered DAS, and would have paid more to 
protect its interests. There was never an intent to simply let the 
property go. (R. Vol. 1, p. 3300) 
At the time of the sale from Galiano to DAS, 43 of the original 60 lots remained unsold in 
a development that had already been improved with roads and utilities. According to the 
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Affidavit of Edward Mason, Exhibit B, Cost Projections, approximately $4.7 million had already 
been injected into the property for acquisition and improvements (R. Vol. 1, p. 2589114 and 9, 
B). In short, development was an asset worth protecting. A review of the Ada County 
Assessors records shows that the assessed value of the lots in 2010 was about $27,000 on average 
and in 2012 it increased to about $29,000 on average. This equates to a total lot value of 
approximately $i.i6 million in 20i0 and $1.24 miiiion in 2012. The trial court could take 
judicial notice of the Assessor's records. Moreover, additional profits could be made through the 
construction of homes on the lots and EEF was denied the opportunity to capture these profits as 
well. The point to be taken here is that EEF had substantial incentive to protect its second 
position Deed of Trust and the short sale by RBC created an opportunity for EEF to not only 
protect its security interest but to assume full ownership and control of the development for an 
amount that was one-third of the total amount of money already invested in the deal. 
TitleOne correctly notes that the trial court disregarded EEF' s evidence that it would have 
purchased the property at the short sale had it been given notice of the sale. The question of what 
action EEF would have taken if proper notice had been given is a material factual issue that was 
not appropriately resolved by summary judgment. The answer to that question is also not 
speculation. EEF would have made a business decision given the circumstances it faced. The 
particulars of that decision-making process should have been evaluated by a jury taking into 
consideration the credibility of Dan Thompson and the soundness of his reasoning. EEF was 
denied the opportunity to present evidence to a jury that it would have paid the $860,000 ( or 
more) that RBC was willing to accept to release its Deed of Trust. The fact that RBC was willing 
to accept $860,000 to release its Deed of Trust is not speculation. It is a fact. It is also a fact that 
DAS immediately resold the lots to Corey Barton Homes at a profit. One does not need to 
speculate as to what deal could have been negotiated since it actually occurred and is part of the 
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record. Further evidence disregarded by the Court was that DAS would not have purchased the 
property, had it known of EEF' s second position Deed of unless EEF' s had been 
addressed in the Eck Affidavit, 9[ 21, R. 001245) DAS needed EEF to 
agree to subordinate Deed of Trust to the new Deed of Trust that DAS placed on the property. 
Otherwise, EEF would have been in first position ahead of DAS' s lender. 
EEF' s Deed Trust taking first position is significant because the proceeds from each iot 
sale would have been applied to reduce the principal amount of EEF's note with Galiano under 
the Master Credit Agreement The 43 remaining lots in the development vvmlld have had to have 
a value of at least $725,500 to render the EEF Deed of Trust and security interest fully protected. 
As we know, DAS quickly sold all of the lots to Corey Barton Homes for approximately $1.13 
million. TitleOne admits that EEF offered "some evidence" of these sales which is somewhat 
disingenuous. The numbers were actually taken from DAS's Seller's Settlement Statements in 
the Corey Barton Homes transactions so the $1.3 million figure is undisputed evidence (See R 
00254 7-002562). 
The proceeds from the sales of the lots would have fully satisfied the EEF Deed of Trust if 
it was in first position. This evidence was ignored by the trial court and simply dismissed as mere 
speculation. EEF submits that the trial court erred when it resolved this factual issue in favor of 
TitleOne. Rather, the trial court should have given all reasonable inferences to EEF including 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that EEF would have taken action to protect its security 
interest and assumed first position. That conclusion would lead to a determination that EEF' s 
security interest, after moving to first position, would have a value of $725,500 since the property 
was clearly worth more than $725,500 so EEF's security interest was fully protected. The loss of 
that security interest, therefore, resulted in damages to EEF in that amount. 
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TitleOne cites the case of Rooz v. Kimmel, 55 CaL App.4th 573 (Cal. D. Ct App. 1997) in 
support of contention that EEF' s security interest had no value and hence no damage could 
been sustained wrongful stripping. Rooz case is particularly relevant here since 
the Rooz court did, in fact, engage in an analysis of what would have happened if the Deed of 
Trust in question had been properly recorded in a timely manner by the defendant Title Company 
(North American). To briefly summarize the pertinent facts of Rooz, Rooz received a Deed of 
Trust from Kimmel in the original amount of $445,000 which was later increased to $515,000 to 
be secured by the Redstone Building upon its acquisition. The $445,000 Deed of Trust was 
initially secured by a building in Berkeley that Rooz had sold to Kimmel as part of an exchange 
agreement Kimmel closed escrow on the Redstone Building with a purchase price of $1.5 
million. A first Deed of Trust was recorded in the amount of $975,000. North American delayed 
the recording of the Rooz Deed of Trust that was supposed to be in second position. During the 
delay, Kimmel encumbered the building with two additional Deeds of Trust totaling $1,050,000. 
Rooz's Deed of Trust was then recorded in fourth position instead of second position. 
The commercial real estate market declined and the second deed of trust holder foreclosed 
on the Redstone Building thereby extinguishing Rooz' s fourth position Deed of Trust. Because 
Rooz believed Kimmel and North American had wrongly impaired his security on the $515,000 
note, he sued them for breach of oral agreement, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and 
civil conspiracy. 
The trial court found in favor of Rooz and calculated damages based upon the original 
amount of the $445,000 Deed of Trust and then discounted the damages to present value. The 
trial court also used a value of $1.9 million for the Berkeley building in its calculations. Rooz 
argued that the $515,000 Deed of Trust should have been used in the calculation and that the 
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reduction to present value was erroneous. The Court of Appeal agreed with Rooz stating the 
following: 
We conclude Rooz is correct on this point Rooz agreed Kimmel 
could remove the $445,000 deed of trust against the Berkeley 
property before Kimmel acquired title to the Redstone Building. 
Thus, neither Kimmel nor North American breached a contract or 
tort duty to Rooz when they recorded the reconveyance of the 
$445,000 deed of trust against the Berkeley property. The breach 
came later, when Kimmel refused to permit North American to 
record the new $5 I 5,000 deed of trust in second position on the 
Redstone Building. It was that breach that led to the impairment 
of Rooz's security by moving it from second to fourth position. 
Presumably, had Rooz been in second position, his $515,000 note 
would have been fully secured (or at least better secured) when the 
Redstone Building was sold in foreclosure. Rooz at 595, emphasis 
added. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that it was appropriate to consider what would have 
happened if Rooz' s Deed of Trust had been recorded in second position rather than fourth 
position. This was not speculation. It was an analysis of what would have happened absent the 
improper recording of the Deed of Trust. Here, the trial court should have considered what would 
have happened if EEF was notified of the short sale. The evidence before the court was that EEF 
would have negotiated with RBC and paid what DAS paid or more to protect its security interest. 
EEF was not willing to just let the property go. 
From a practical standpoint, EEF had already invested $725,500 into the property. 
Galiano had likewise invested $4.7 million to acquire the land and install utilities and roads in the 
development. There was significant value in the project. There were 43 bare lots ready for sale. 
Moreover, EEF had the ability to ride out the downturn in the market and it was prepared to do so 
(R 001967). Due to the actions of TitleOne, EEF was denied the opportunity to assume first 
position. All of this evidence creates material issues of fact that were simply not appropriately 
resolved by way of summary judgment. Furthermore, the trial court actually gave the benefit of 
all inferences to TitleOne rather than EEF, the non-moving party, which is further error. It should 
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also be noted that all of the California cases cited by TitleOne involved full trials, not summary 
judgment proceedings. Here, EEF was wrongfully denied the opportunity to present this evidence 
to a 
EEF respectfully submits that the trial court erred when it dismissed as speculation evidence 
that EEF would have acquired the RBC Deed of Trust thereby assuming first position on its own 
Deed of Trust. The trial court further erred when it concluded that EEF s security interest had no 
value such that EEF suffered no cognizable damage as a result of TitleOne' s wrongful 
reconveyance. As stated above, if EEF had taken over first position, then lot sales that actually 
occurred provided more than enough proceeds to fully repay the Galiano loan. EEF's security 
interest would have been protected and EEF would have been made whole. Accordingly, EEF 
requests that the trial court's granting of summary judgment be reversed and that the case be 
remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings including a jury trial. 
B. Assuming That the Three-Year Statute of Limitations Period Set Forth in I.C. § 5-
218(1) Applies to EEF's I.C. §45-1205 Claim, the Trial Court Erred In Determining 
When the Statute Accrued. 
TitleOne is also correct in its statement that the trial court ultimately dismissed all of EEF's 
claims based upon a determination that no proof of cognizable damages was shown. However, 
Judge Wilpur did conclude that J.C. §5-218( 1) applied to EEF' s I.C. §45-1205 claim and that the 
statute of limitations began to accrue on the date of the wrongful reconveyance rather than on the 
date that EEF suffered actual damage. It is submitted that the trial court erred in its determination 
of the accrual date of the statute of limitations. 
EEF was not damaged by the wrongful reconveyance until May 12, 2012, when Galiano sold 
the property to DAS without notice to EEF thereby stripping EEF of its security interest. Prior to 
the sale, the wrongful reconveyance could have been corrected with no harm being suffered by 
EEF had EEF been aware of it. It was the sale and loss of its security interest (damages) that 
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completed EEF' s cause of action and triggered the running of the statute of limitations. The 
accrual date should therefore be May 12, 2012, the date of the sale to DAS by Galiano. With 
date, the EEF §45-1205 cause of action would be timely. 
TitleOne misses the mark when it argues that there is no discovery rule exception associated 
with LC. § 5-218(1 ). EEF is not asserting that a discovery rule applies in this case. Rather, EEF 
contends that the tortious conduct engaged in by TitleOne h continuing in nature and that the 
cause of action under I.C. §45-1205 does not accrue until actual damage is suffered. This same 
rationale was applied by this Court in Streib v Veigel, l09 Idaho 174 (1985). In other words, it 
was not the wrongful recoveyance that caused actual damage. The reconveyance was the 
negligent act that lead to the damage and was continuing in nature. The operative event that 
resulted in the loss of EEF's security interest was the short sale by Galiano to DAS. At that point, 
and only at that point, was EEF harmed. 
TitleOne' s negligent act of wrongfully reconveying EEF' s Deed of Trust is analogous to the 
negligent preparation of a tax return that was at issue in Streib. It was not until the tax return was 
audited by the IRS and certain deductions were disallowed that the client suffered actual damage. 
The audit with attendant damage completed the tort and it was at that time that the statute of 
limitations accrued. 
It is noteworthy that TitleOne makes no effort to rebut or otherwise distinguish the Streib case 
cited by EEF in its Opening Brief. Perhaps this should be viewed as a concession by TitleOne 
that the reasoning and logic employed by the Court in Streib controls in this case. The analysis 
that this Court applied in Streib is equally applicable here. Different types of professionals 
preparing and filing documents that are subsequently found to be inaccurate resulting in damage 
to the client in some form, i.e. disallowed deductions and penalties or the loss of a security 
interest. In both cases, actual damage occurred after the preparation and filing of the erroneous 
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I 
document. In Streib, the statute of limitations began running at the time of the IRS audit. Here, 
the statute of limitations should be deemed to have commenced running at the time of the sale by 
Galiano to DAS which resulted in the stripping of EEF' s interest. 
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred in its determination that the 
statute of limitations accrued on the date of the wrongful reconveyance rather than when EEF 
suffered actual harm. EEF therefore re4uesls that the trial court's ruling be reversed and that this 
case be remanded back to the trial court with instructions that the applicable statute of limitations 
commenced running at the time of the sale of the property by Galiano to DAS. 
C. EEF's Claim for Tortious Interference ·with Prospective Economic Advantage Was 
Dismissed by the Trial Court on the Sole Ground That EEF Suffered No Damage 
The trial court dismissed EEF' s cause of action for tortious interference on the sole basis that 
EEF failed to prove any cognizable damages. The court did not rule on any other grounds so 
TitleOne' s arguments addressing the remaining elements of the tort are not germane to this 
appeal. EEF therefore reasserts all of the arguments raised in its briefing addressing the errors 
committed by the trial court in its holding that EEF suffered no damage. 
D. The Prevailing Party on this Appeal is Entitled to Recover its Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3). 
The gravamen of the claims asserted in this case deals with a commercial transaction under 
Great Plains Equip v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,471, 36 P.3d 218,223 (2001). 
The prevailing party on the appeal should be awarded its attorney's fees. 
III. ARGUMENT - COREY BARTON HOMES 
A. DAS and CBH Had Inquiry Notice of Defects in the Chain of Title Such that DAS 
Should Not Be Deemed a Bona Fide Purchaser and CBH Should Not Have Been 
Afforded the Protection of the Shelter Rule. 
In connection with EEF's Motion to Amend its complaint, the trial court held as follows: 
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As discussed above, DAS is a "bona fide purchaser" of the 
property, with the right to convey it free and clear of unknown 
claims, including EEF' s claimed lienholder interest. As also 
discussed above, DAS's transferees and all subsequent transferees 
are protected by the "shelter rule, absent evidence supporting a 
conclusion that one of the shelter rule's exceptions applies. 
Accordingly, the transferees also own the property free and clear of 
EEF's claimed lienholder interest. EEFs quiet-title claim is 
therefore futile. Permission to amend is denied. (R. 003133) 
The basis for the trial court's denial of EEF's motion to amend was that DAS was a bona 
fide purchaser and that CBH was protected by the shelter rule. It is submitted that the trial court 
erred in these findings and that EEF' s motion to amend should have been granted. EEF presented 
evidence to the court that subsequent to the February 11, 20 IO unauthorized full reconveyance 
recorded by TitleOne, EEF was requested to execute two additional partial reconveyances which 
were then recorded. These three reconveyances were part of the public record at the time of the 
short sale. The trial court concluded that the two subsequent partial reconveyances were not 
related to the property purchased by DAS and could not furnish the basis for a duty on DAS' s 
part to inquire about the validity of the full reconveyance. (R. 003128 ). It is submitted that the 
trial court erred in this ruling. 
EEF, after the recording by TitleOne of the full reconveyance, technically had no interest 
in the property that could be the subject of a subsequent partial reconveyance. The fact that two 
such partial reconveyances were, in fact, recorded showed a glaring irregularity in the chain of 
title to the property that triggered a duty on DAS' s part to inquire about the irregularity regardless 
of whether or not the lots involved in the two partial reconveyances were being purchased by 
DAS. It certainly put DAS on notice that EEF was in the chain of title. 
A review of the deeds going from Galiano to DAS and then from DAS to CBH is also 
indicative of DAS's knowledge that it was not obtaining clean title from Galiano. Galiano 
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provided DAS with a General Warranty Deed (R. 001316). That deed contains the following 
language: 
Grantor does hereby covenant to and with Grantee, and its 
successors and assigns forever, that Grantor is owner in fee 
simple of the Premises; that Grantor has a good right to convey 
the fee simple; that the Premises is free from any and all liens, 
claims, encumbrances or other defects of title except the Permitted 
Exceptions; that Grantor shall and will warrant and defend the quiet 
and peaceful possession of said Premises by Grantee, and its 
successors and assigns forever, against all other claims whatsoever; 
and that Grantor and its heirs and assigns will, on demand of the 
Grantee or its heirs or assigns, execute any instrument necessary for 
the further assurance of the title to the Premises that may be 
reasonably required. (R. 001317) 
DAS, on the other hand, provided CBH with Special Warranty Deeds for each of the lot 
sales that significantly reduced DAS' s representations as to the validity of the title that was 
passing. Each of the Special Warranty Deeds contains the following language: 
Grantor makes no covenants or warranties with respect to title, 
express or implied, other than as expressly stated herein. Grantor is 
the owner of the Premises and has not conveyed the same estate to 
any person other than Grantee and that such estate is at the time of 
the execution of this instrument free from encumbrances done or 
made directly by Grantor and any encumbrances of record. (R. 
002906) 
If DAS truly believed there were no problems with title, then why did it not give CBH a 
General Warranty Deed with the same representations that Galiano provided in the deed to DAS? 
Why did CBH accept Special Warranty Deeds? The reasonable inference is that DAS knew it 
was not receiving clean title and it was protecting itself by giving CBH watered down deeds. 
This evidence was ignored by the court. In fact, the court gave DAS and CBH favorable 
inferences rather than giving the inference to EEF. Moreover, the court decided disputed material 
issues of fact that should have been left for a jury. For these reasons, it is submitted that the trial 
court erred in denying EEF' s motion to amend. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in Appellant's Brief, EEF respectfully 
requests that reverse the court's orders granting summary judgment to 
and denying EEF' s motion to amend its complaint and remand this case back to the trial court for 
further proceedings including trial by jury. 
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